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TRADE, TARIFFS AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY: 
THE CASE OF SPANISH FIRMS 
Marion Dovis and Juliette Milgram-Baleix 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine the sensitivity of total factor productivity 
(TFP) to foreign competition in the case of a European country. Using the Olley and 
Pakes (1996) method, we calculate the TFP of Spanish manufacturing firms and study 
the impact of EU tariffs, foreign competition and imports on TFP at the firm level. 
Applying the System-GMM method, we find that TFP is negatively impacted by 
European tariffs, whereas the competition, in the form of increased presence of foreign 
products in the domestic market and firms’ imports, leads to improvements of the TFP. 
Moreover, these two effects are complementary. We also find evidence of important 
asymmetries among firms depending on their involvement in foreign markets.   
Keywords: Total factor productivity, Spain, trade, tariffs, heterogeneity of firms. 




El objetivo de este artículo es estudiar la sensibilidad de la productividad total de 
los factores (PTF) a la competencia extranjera en el caso de un país europeo. 
Calculamos la PTF de las empresas manufactureras españolas con el método de Olley y 
Pakes (1996) y estudiamos el impacto de los aranceles europeos, de la competencia 
extranjera y de las importaciones sobre la PTF de las empresas. Utilizando el método 
System-GMM, obtenemos que la PTF se ve negativamente afectada por los aranceles 
europeos, mientras la competencia, bajo la forma de una presencia mayor de productos 
extranjeros en el mercado doméstico o en términos de importaciones de las empresas, 
contribuye a mejorar la PTF. Además, estos dos efectos son complementarios. 
Encontramos también pruebas de importantes asimetrías entre las empresas, 
dependiendo de su grado de implicación en los mercados internacionales.  
Palabras clave: productividad total de los factores, España, comercio, aranceles, 
heterogeneidad de las empresas.   3
 
 Introduction 
  Do we know everything about the link between openness and productivity at the 
micro-level? Krugman (1979) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) showed, in a context 
of homogeneous firms, that the exploitation of scale economies is a possible source of 
productivity gains (often designed as a pro-competitive effect). Melitz (2003), Yeaple 
(2005) and Bernard et al. (2003) explained the increase of productivity at the industry-
level following a decrease in trade costs by the market-share effect, that is, the 
reallocation of resources among firms in favour of the most productive ones
1. Learning-
by-doing and externalities, technical innovation through imports of intermediate goods 
and managerial efforts are other possible sources of productivity improvements that 
have been evidenced by different theoretical models in the eighties (Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), Ethier (1982), Markusen (1989), Young (1991), Stokey (1991), Xie 
(1999)). In sum, theoretical models that consider the heterogeneity of firms do not 
contemplate the effect of the decrease in trade costs on intra-firm productivity; models 
that contemplate the effect of trade on intra-firm productivity do not consider the firms’ 
heterogeneity. As pointed by Tybout (2000), a mix of these three mechanisms will 
probably describe more realistically the relation between openness and intra-firm 
productivity. This empirical issue can now be investigated thanks to firm-level data.  
In recent years, there has been a widespread effort to investigate the channel 
through which trade liberalisation takes place at the firm level in developing countries
2. 
The studies of Pavcnik (2002), Schor (2004), Topalova (2004), Amiti and Konings 
(2005) and Fernandes (2007), respectively for Chile, Brazil, India, Indonesia and 
Columbia are good examples. As pointed out by Trefler (2004), there are fewer studies 
focussing on industrialised countries and on countries that engage in bilateral free trade, 
except his own study on the Canada-US Free Trade agreement. However, the diffusion 
of technology and knowledge through the acquisition of intermediate and / or capital 
goods can take place more easily among countries that are very close and have flexible 
markets as demonstrated by Eaton and Kortum (2002). This is another motivation to 
                                                 
1 Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) offer strong support for their main conclusions. 
2 Focussing on a trade liberalisation period offers strong advantages. However, it may hide some response 
of the productive sector that may occur in a medium term since specialisation may be a long dynamic 
process (Cuñat and Maffezzoli, 2007).   4
focus on industrialised countries or transition economies. Finally, according to the 
debate on regionalism versus multilateralism, it is important to check the sensitivity of 
members of the trading blocks to the external tariffs. Indeed, if a large amount of trade 
takes place among the partners inside the FTA, the detrimental effect of external tariffs 
may not be so obvious since the intra-block market is large
3.  
  In this paper, we focus on the effect of tariffs and foreign competition on TFP of 
Spanish manufacturing firms
4. Our dataset covers the period 1991-2002. This period 
can be considered as a post-liberalisation period for the Spanish economy since the last 
significant part of trade liberalisation occurred during the 1980s and the dismantling of 
trade barriers in the framework of the adhesion to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) ended in 1992. Political reforms and the dismantling of restrictions on capital 
flows marked the 1980s along with a massive reallocation process among industries, 
labour markets. After the 1992 ERM crisis, Spain left the ERM. Following the 
devaluation of the Peseta, Spain experienced an exceptional growth of its openness ratio 
without facing big imbalances all over the period. Its trade with the EU and especially 
intra-industry trade increased sharply.  
Like the most recent studies, we follow a two-step strategy. First, we use the 
Olley and Pakes (1996) method to obtain a measure of total factor productivity of firms. 
Our results confirm that during the nineties, the increasing openness of Spanish trade 
was contemporaneous with a large increase in productivity in the manufacturing 
industries, largely explained by intra-firm productivity growth. In a second step, we 
estimate an equation where TFP is explained by a set of characteristics of the firms and 
trade policy indicators. We use the system–GMM method proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) to deal with the possible endogeneity of observable characteristics of the 
firms. We also control, in a consistent manner, unobservable characteristics that may 
explain current intra-firm productivity by taking into account the lagged value of 
productivity.  
                                                 
3 Frankel et al. (1996), Wei and Frankel (1996) and Panagariya and Krishna (2002) are some articles that 
illustrate this debate. 
4 For Spain, as far as we know, the link between trade and productivity has not been studied at the firm 
level. Most studies have focused on the relationship between productivity and exports, where productivity 
is estimated using index method or stochastic frontier method or approximated by value added per worker 
(Barrios et al. (2003), Barrios and Strobl, (2004), Fariñas and Martin-Marcos (2007), Campa (2004), 
Merino and Salas (2002),. Salomon and Shaver (2005), Mañez et al. (2004), Huergo and Jaumandreu 
(2004). Delgado, Fariñas and Ruano (2002) and Fariñas and Ruano (2004 and 2005) study productivity 
distributions.   5
We use two different measures for openness for each industry: MFN tariffs of 
the EU and Spanish import penetration rate (IPR). Another important distinctive feature 
of our study is that these two measures are not substitutes due to the characteristics of 
the country under study. The first one is the result of EU negotiations with GATT 
members. It is a direct component of third country prices while EU countries are 
granted duty-free access in the EU market. Thus, IPR brings some additional 
information since it measures the degree of foreign competition in the Spanish market 
taking into account the growing import flows from third countries but also from the EU.  
We address at least three questions. First, do trade policy indicators affect 
productivity of Spanish firms directly? We find that TFP is negatively impacted by 
European tariffs and positively benefits from the presence of foreign products. 
Moreover, these two effects are complementary. Secondly, is there any evidence of TFP 
gains via imports of inputs? We find evidence of additional productivity gains for 
importing firms. Third, are there some asymmetries among firms in the sensitivity to 
these trade openness indicators? We find that the impact of exposure to trade and 
sensitivity to tariffs differ sharply among firms, depending on their size and 
involvement in foreign markets. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents some important stylised 
facts concerning Spanish trade liberalisation. Section 2 presents the data and the 
empirical methodology. Results are displayed and analysed in Section 3, and Section 4 
provides some conclusions. 
1.  Stylised facts 
According to the agreement between Spain and the EEC, the dismantling of 
trade barriers among members started in 1986. For products for which the difference 
between Spanish tariff rates and the Common external rate (CET) was inferior to 15%, 
CET was applied straightforward. For the rest of the products, a progressive dismantling 
that ended in 1993 was applied. The Spanish average tariff for non-agricultural products 
was 12,33% for products from the EEC and 16,44% from third countries. The 
dismantling of tariff barriers was accompanied by a dismantling of quantitative 
restrictions, a new VAT tax and suppression of ICGI (tax of internal compensation that 
consisted in a lower tax on sales for locally produced products). The effective rate, that 
is, the amount of import tax revenue related to the value of imports was estimated at 
5.44% in 1985. The suppression of ICGI also had an important dismantling effect 
(Cañada et al. 1991) since it brought 7.81% of imports' value.   6
Quantitative restrictions with the EEC members were generally eliminated and 
Spain had to maintain the same barriers as the EEC for third countries. However, there 
was a large list of exceptions for “sensitive products”. Among others, Spain was 
allowed to maintain quantitative restrictions during three additional years for cars, 
metal, ships, TV, textiles, wearing (see Tamames, 1986).  
Although, Spanish tariffs were completely adapted to EEC norms at the end of 
1992, the dismantling was just the beginning of Spanish trade taking-off. Concerning 
the sectors that cover our data, the average of export to output ratio increased from 27% 
to 39% between 1991 and 2002 and the average import to output ratio from 18% to 
32%. Amazingly, the trade deficit has remained stable over the period (5.8% PIB) 
which can be considered as a successful integration experience. These data confirm that 
the Spanish case over the period 1991-2002 is a very interesting case to study. 
Import competition and exports increased sharply in the markets of electrical 
products, leather and leather products, vehicles, plastic and rubber products and other 
transport equipments. The basic metal sector has also experienced an intensification of 
trade but mainly due to imports, and the food and tobacco sector mainly due to exports. 
The chemical sector, wood, paper, textile and textile products and other manufactured 
products have increased their exports and their imports but not strongly. For the others, 
trade has been stable. 
For the period under study 1991-2002, Spanish tariffs were already adapted to 
the Common External tariff rate. We use MFN tariff. Due to the application of the 
different cycles of the GATT (Tokyo Round, Uruguay Round) the EU tariff rate slightly 
diminished all over the period. They are higher in food products (42%) and range from 
4% to 10% in the remaining industries. Tariffs for 1991 and 2002 by industry are 
displayed in Table 3 in appendix 1.  
2.  Empirical strategy 
We follow a two-step strategy that became relatively standard in the literature 
(see Pavcnik (2002), Schor (2004), Topalova (2004), Amiti and Konings (2005) and 
Fernandes (2007)). In a first step, we use the Olley and Pakes (1996) method to measure 
total factor productivity of firms. In a second step, we estimate an equation, where TFP 
is explained by: a set of characteristics of the firms, the lagged productivity and trade 
policy indicators using the System–GMM method.    7
We use data on Spanish manufacturing firms coming from the Encuesta sobre 
Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), an annual survey carried out by the SEPI Ministry of 
Industry. The ESEE is representative for the Spanish manufacturing firms classified by 
industrial sector and size categories
5 and includes exhaustive information at the firm 
level. The ESEE offers detailed data on balance sheets, sales, inventories and materials, 
volume of exports and imports among others. For each firm, we know the region it is 
located in and the sector of the NACE-93 classification. We cleaned the data in order to 
correct or eliminate problems due to non-reporting or misreporting. We dropped 
observations for 1990 that were too incomplete and observations with non-reporting 
value for fixed assets. The total number of firms in the database is 3462. At the end of 
our cleaning process, the sample consisted of 3107 firms
6 and 20882 observations for 
the period 1991-2002. Details about the cleaning process are provided in the Annex.  
In this section, we explain the method used to measure TFP at the firm-level and 
comment the result of the decompositions of TFP growth by industry which sheds some 
light on the characteristics of the case under study. Then, we present the empirical 
model we estimated and the estimation method. 
2.1.  Productivity measurement 
The link between trade and productivity at the firm level has been studied using 
a wide range of methodologies concerning the measures of productivity. A first 
generation of studies used various measures of efficiency and obtained mixed results
7. 
In most recent studies, firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) is calculated following 
the Olley and Pakes (1996) method. As far as we know, this method hasn’t been 
performed yet in the Spanish case. This method corrects the simultaneity bias arising 
from the fact that firms choose their level of input once they know their level of 
                                                 
5 The participation rate to the survey is about 70% for firms with more than 200 employees. Firms that 
employed between 10 to 200 (small firms) were randomly sampled by industry and size strata holding 
around a 5% of the population. 
6 Some summary statistics are displayed in Table 1 in appendix 1. 
7 Tybout and Westbrook (1991) find little evidence of intra-firm productivity improvements after the 
Chilean liberalisation. Harrison (1994) for the Ivory Coast finds that foreign competition forces down 
mark-ups among firms. Using the same methodology, Krishna and Mitra (1998) find more weak evidence 
for India. Using the above mentioned decomposition, Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find that increases in 
openness are associated with relatively small scale efficiency but significant “residual” gains in Mexico. 
Driffield and Kambhampati (2003) show that the increase of firms’ imports did not raise efficiency in the 
case of Indian firms.   8
productivity. It also corrects the selection bias arising from the fact that producers 
choose to stay or leave the market, depending on their productivity level, which in turn 
depends on their production factor. To this end, investment is considered as a proxy
8 for 
the unobserved productivity shocks.  
This method infers TFP at the firm level as the difference between the observed 
output and the predicted output function. Let us suppose that the technology of firm i is 
well described by a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
it it it k it m it t it k m l y η ω β β β β + + + + + = 0      (1) 
where  it y  is the logarithm of the firm’s output,  it l  the logarithm of the labour input,  it m  
the logarithm of the intermediary materials and  it k  is the logarithm of the capital. The 
error term has two components: the plant-specific productivity component given as  it ω , 
and  it η , an error term that is uncorrelated with input choices. The investment function is 
given as: 
() it it t it k i i , ω =      (2) 
Assuming that investment function is monotonically increasing in  it ω  as in 
Pakes (1994), it can be inverted to obtain the productivity shock ωit as a function of iit 
and kit : 
() it it t it k i h , = ω      (3) 
The higher the investment is, the higher the productivity will be. So, the 
production function can now be expressed as: 
() it it it t it m it l it k i m l y η φ β β + + + = ,      (4) 
where 
() () it it t it k it it t k i h k k i , , 0 + + = β β φ      (5) 
                                                 
8 Since there are fewer observations with zero-investment values in our sample than in a sample of firms 
from developing countries, we are able to build a consistent measure of productivity. Moreover, 
production function estimations without zero-investment values are close to the estimations with zero-
investment values.   9
Following Olley and Pakes, we approximate the unknown function,  t φ , by a 
fourth order polynomial in  it k  and  it i . In the first stage,  l β ,  m β  and  t φ  are estimated 
and in the second stage we evaluate the survival probability of the firm,  it P . The third 
stage of the routine identifies the coefficient  k β  where productivity is assumed to 
evolve according to a first-order Markov process:  [] 1 , 1 1 1 1 = − = + + + + it it it it it X E ω ω ω ξ , 
with ξit+1 the innovation in ωit+1. This final stage uses the estimations of βl, βm, φt et Pit 
to obtain βk: 
( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 ˆ , ˆ ~ ˆ ˆ
+ + + + + + + + − + = − − it it it k t it it k it m it l it k P g k m l y η ξ β φ β β β      (6) 
Finally, we use the efficient coefficients’ estimates to build a measure of firm 
productivity as done by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Pavcnik (2002). This index is 
calculated by subtracting the productivity of a reference plant from the productivity of a 
particular firm, measured as the difference between its predicted output and its actual 
output at time t
9. The productivity of the reference firm is constructed with the mean 
output and the mean input level in the based year. We obtain: 
() r r it k it m it l it it y y k m l y TFP ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − − − − − = β β β      (7) 
where yr is the average of the log output of firms in 1991 ( it r y y = ) and  r y ˆ  is the 
predicted average log output in 1991 ( it k it m it l r k m l y β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + = ). This index represents 
the deviation of a firm from the average industry practice in a base year. Coefficients 
are reported in Table 2 for 17 industries (in appendix 1). Coefficients are significant at 
the 1-% level in most cases and range in similar intervals as other studies.  
We also aggregate the firm level productivity to obtain productivity level and 
growth, at the industry level. As in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998), we 
decompose productivity growth to evaluate the contribution of intra-firm productivity, 
reallocation among firms, entry and exit of firms, to total growth of firms’ TFP. Total 
factor productivity of firms is measured as: 
k m l y TFP k m l it β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ − − − =      (9) 
                                                 
9 This index is transitive and insensitive to the units of measurement.    10
This decomposition identifies five components of the aggregate productivity 
(Table 4 in appendix 1): 
( )










− + − +
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(10) 
where C represents continuer firms, N entering firms and X exiting firms. TFPjt is the 
weighted average TFP of the industry j in log with  τ − − = Δ t j jt jt TFP TFP TFP .The first 
component represents the "within effect" calculated as the sum of firm-level 
productivity changes, weighted by its initial market share. The second component 
represents the "between effect" (or the reallocation effect). It measures changes in 
market shares weighted by the deviations of initial firm productivity from the initial 
overall industry average. The third component is the "covariance effect" of the firms’ 
productivity variations and market shares changes. The last two terms in equation 10 are 
the entry and the exit effects that represent the contribution of entering and exiting firms 
to the sector level TFP growth. 
The aggregate productivity increased from 1991 to 2002 in all industries, except 
Food and Tobacco. The increases are, in most cases superior to 15% what represents a 
moderate increase of 1.3% per year. Industries that have the highest increase in 
productivity (3.3% per year) are the industries of rubber and plastic products and 
electrical and optical equipments. In this period, we do not find that reallocation among 
firms had contributed positively to the growth of productivity. Only in some industries 
like wood and chemicals, this reallocation explains a great part of the productivity 
growth.  
The growth of intra-firm productivity weighted by initial market share (“within 
effect”) is always positive except for the industry of Leather products. This effect 
explains most part of TFP growth in textile, wood, paper, printing products, other non 
metallical mineral products, basic metals, machinery and equipment and other 
manufactured products. The higher the initial market shares of the firms that increase 
their productivity are, the higher this effect will be. The “between effect” is mostly 
negative (12 sectors of 17) and has a poor contribution on aggregate productivity 
growth. The “covariance effect” for all the sectors except wood, paper, printing 
products and other manufactured goods, is positive. In chemical products, machinery 
and equipment, vehicles and other transport equipment, this effect seems to play an 
important role in the aggregate productivity growth. The effect of exit is very weak and 
mostly positive but in four industries, this effect is reflecting negatively the fact, that   11
firms that exit our sample are not necessarily less productive than the average. On the 
opposite, the entrance of firms is positive and has a big impact on aggregate 
productivity growth of leather and leather products, wood, paper, rubber and plastics 
products and electrical and optical equipments. Since we consider as entrant firms, all 
firms that enter after 1991 and still exist in 2002, this effect partly reflects the 
productivity growth of these firms after their entrance. This result is in line with the 
theoretical predictions according to which an increase in competition, forces entering 
firms to have a higher level of productivity. 
2.2.  Estimation strategy 
The next step consists of estimating the effect of trade policy measures on TFP. 
Unlike most studies, except Fernandes (2007), we control for lagged productivity since 
we believe that TFP determinants are highly persistent. In contrast to Fernandes (2007) 
who run OLS and fixed effects estimations of this equation accounting for plant fixed 
effect, we use dynamic panel data techniques. Indeed, our data set allows us to take into 
account other crucial observable characteristics of the firms like import and export 
intensities, that may influence their reaction to trade. However, these characteristics are 
not strictly exogenous and fixed-effect estimations may lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates. We prefer then the system– Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
method proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to deal with this issue
10. They show that 
when the dependent variable follows a path close to a random walk, the differenced-
GMM from Arellano and Bond (1991) has poor finite sample properties, and it is 
downwards biased, especially when T is small. Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
propose another estimator (the System-GMM) derived from the estimation of a system 
of two simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged levels as instruments) and the 
other in first differences (with lagged first differences as instruments). In multivariate 
dynamic panel models, the System-GMM estimator is shown to perform better than the 
differenced-GMM when series are persistent and there is a dramatic reduction in the 
finite sample bias due to the exploitation of additional moment conditions (Blundell and 
Bond (2000). This estimation method allows us to assume that the firms’ characteristics 
and the import penetration rate are endogenous variables. Their first (or second) 
difference are instrumented by the lags of their own first (or second) difference and all 
                                                 
10 Another possibility is proposed by Fernandes (2007) and referred as the direct approach. It consists of 
introducing trade policy indicators and all characteristics in the first equation of the production function. 
Thus, she finally finds that there is no strong difference between the direct and indirect approaches.   12
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it is a vector of firm’s characteristics , X
T
jt is a vector of trade variables, ηt are time 
specific effects which take into account macroeconomic shocks common to all firms, ηi 
an individual specific effect and εit is an error term. 
We check the impact of trade intensification using two trade policy variables: 
tariff rates and import penetration rates. For tariffs, we use the tariffs for the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN)
12 of the EU since Spain already adapted its tariffs to the CET 
in 1991
13. We choose to use the simple average of these indicators at the industry level 
since a weighted average (using imports or value added as weights) tends to 
underestimate tariffs. However, it could be argued that tariffs are endogenously 
determined, but we think that using EU tariffs rates guarantees a sufficient 
disconnection between the choice of these tariffs and Spanish lobbies. Thus, we use the 
lagged value of tariffs. Tariffs are supposed to protect firms and should have a negative 
impact on TFP. We define the Import Penetration Rate at the industry level for year t 
(IPRjt), as the ratio between imports and imports plus production at the two-digit level. 
Since the IPR directly depends on the production of the industry, there is also a 
potential endogeneity bias in this case, and for this reason, we consider it as endogenous 
variable in our system. We also take into account the Herfindahl index calculated as the 
sum of the squared market share of firms for an industry. The higher the Herfindahl 
index, the less competitive is the market. We guess that in non-competitive industries, 
firms adjust their margins in response to trade liberalisation, rather than their 
productivity, so, we expect a negative sign for this variable. In the same line, the market 
share (as indicated by the firm) is an interesting variable. It gives a subjective view of 
the performance of the firm that can differ from the one we observe. This is mainly due 
                                                 
11 Industry indicators are not necessary in our regression analysis because the reference firm included in 
the total factor productivity measure plays the same role. To integrate industry indicators would absorb 
the reference firm. 
12 Note that we find same results with the use of the Effectively Applied Rates and with the weighted 
average of MFN tariffs.  
13 Tariffs at the 2-digit level of Nace classification were aggregated according to the ISIC Rev.3 
classification to make it homogeneous with the classification used in the ESEE.    13
to the fact that an entrepreneur refers to a precise market in terms of products, while we 
calculate the market share as the ratio of the firm output and the output of the whole 
industry. As explained, firms with larger market shares may increase their TFP in 
response to competitive pressure or reduce their margins. Though, it can be the case that 
more productive firms capture a larger share of the market. Then, we cannot clearly 
predict the sign of this variable. 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Ethier (1982), Markusen (1989) pointed out that 
foreign competition may also affect the incentives to innovate; increase technology 
transfers or raise intra-firm productivity through an increase in the variety of 
intermediate inputs or capital goods due to higher quality and/or better technology. To 
test for this hypothesis, we also include the import share of firms to explain the firms’ 
TFP and expect a positive impact of this variable. Another important hypothesis of the 
literature about integration is that it allows better access to the international markets. 
However, Spanish producers were already granted free-access from 1986 onwards. The 
rapid increase of Spanish exports all over the 1990s is sufficient to think that the effects 
of the EU entry were diffused over time. It could be the case that a decrease in trade 
costs in the EU lowered the minimum productivity level that Spanish exporters needed 
to enter the EU market. Wagner (2007) summarises the results of 45 econometric 
studies with micro data referred to 33 countries. He concludes that exporters are, in 
general, more productive than non-exporters. This may be due to the "learning by 
exporting" process that is the fact that productivity may improve following the access to 
foreign markets. Firms access useful technological innovations, international contacts 
facilitate the technological diffusion and foster a more efficient organisation of firms. 
Alternatively, it may be explained by the presence of sunk costs at exporting. The most 
productive firms self-select into the export markets because they are more likely to cope 
with the sunk costs of entry and survive in the international market. In the Spanish case, 
Delgado, Fariñas and Ruano (2002) identify a self-selection effect, while they find that 
learning by exporting holds only for younger firms. For all these reasons, we expect the 
export intensity to have a positive effect on TFP. Finally, the link between FDI and TFP 
appears robust in most studies for developing countries, confirming the hypothesis of 
Coe and Helpman (1995) that openness can also foster technological spillovers through 
FDI. It seems that some kind of joint venture or participation of foreign companies 
brings new managerial abilities and techniques that benefit to TFP. We also include the 
foreign capital share in order to account for this effect.   14
3.  Results 
In this section, we present the results of various sets of estimations. First, we 
study the average sensitivity of Spanish firms’ TFP to import penetration rate, tariff rate 
and some characteristics of firms like the share of foreign capital, market share and 
export ratio and competition in the market measured by the Herfindahl index. We insist 
on the different effect the trade indicators have on TFP. Secondly, we focus on the 
importance of firms’ import intensity by adding the import intensity as an explanatory 
variable. Finally, we check some asymmetries among firms in their reaction to trade 
policy indicators. We show that reactions differ depending on their size, import and 
export status, and foreign ownership.  
3.1.  Average sensitivity to protection and competition 
We first look at the average sensitivity of TFP to trade measures by estimating 
equation 11 using the System-GMM method
14. Table 5 in appendix 1shows the results 
of estimations including either import penetration rate, tariff rate or both indicators. 
Estimations using the GMM method are based on instruments dated t-2 and before. 
These levels were chosen according to the results of the Sargan test and the test of 
autocorrelation of order 2.  
Our results
15 show that IPR and tariffs have respectively a positive and a 
negative impact
16. These results are in harmony with the theoretical predictions. 
Though, it was not so evident that, in the case of a European country, the sensitivity of 
TFP to tariffs will be significant. More interesting is the fact that foreign competition 
measured by IPR and tariffs have complementary effects. Indeed, when we introduce 
both variables in the regression, there are both significant at the 1-% level, the 
                                                 
14 To control the results from the GMM estimation, we implement the same regressions with OLS and 
within groups. As expected, OLS levels appear to give an upward-biased estimate of the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable whereas within groups give a downward-biased estimate of this coefficient.  
15 Another important issue is the case of the food sector that is highly protected by the EU. The entry of 
Spain into the EU consisted in a raise in the protection level toward third countries, and thus a 
reorientation of its import, production and export in this sector. Then, it could be the case that external 
tariff had protected Spanish firms from the international competition in this sector. We ran the estimations 
excluding this sector and obtained similar results (available upon request), which confirms that the 
negative impact of protection on productivity is an important concern for European countries. 
16 Note that we find the same results when we exclude firms that appear only two or three years.   15
coefficient of IPR estimate remains the same while the one of tariff is lowered. One may 
ask if the potential correlation between the two variables biases these coefficients 
estimate. Let us recall that EU tariffs can be considered as exogenous for the Spanish 
economy and they apply for Spanish imports coming from non-EU countries. 
Consistent with this fact, IPR is only weakly correlated with the tariff rate (30%). IPR 
represents the presence of foreign products in this market and in particular of European 
products, while tariffs are more a measure of government intervention and a component 
of international prices.  
These indicators allow us to capture different dimensions of the increasing 
competition. Namely, the increase of imports works through a decrease in domestic 
market share and the decline of tariffs pressures domestic products’ prices down. 
According to the estimations that take into account both indicators, the sensitivity is 
rather large: a 10% reduction in tariff will lead to an increase of 1.4% of TFP and an 
increase of IPR of 10% would lead to an increase of 2.2%. These results are very 
important since they confirm a high sensitivity to the tariffs even if they are lower than 
in the eighties. 
The characteristics of firms we introduced are significant and confirm, as do 
other studies, that the productivity distribution is not a random process but can be 
controlled by an explanatory process. The shares of exports in production and the share 
of foreign capital in total capital are included in estimations because exporters and the 
affiliates of foreign companies are expected to be more productive than the average in 
general. The share of foreign capital has a positive and significant impact only at the 
10% level. The coefficient of the export to output ratio is positive and significant. 
Sometimes, when the import to output ratio is included, the export to output ratio is not 
significant. It may be explained by some correlation between the two variables (31%), 
corresponding to the fact that exporters prefer to import their intermediate materials in 
order to keep their production costs under control. It is possible that the level of 
productivity is better explained by the participation in the export market than by the 
intensity of exports. Concerning the effect of market structure, the Herfindahl index 
calculated at the industry level has a negative sign, while the market share of the firm as 
indicated by the respondent of the survey has a positive effect on TFP. These results 
indicate that firms, in highly concentrated industries, have a lower level of TFP than 
firms in other industries, while TFP of firms with higher market share will have higher 
level of TFP or practice a higher price what overestimate their TFP.   16
3.2.  Additional gains from imported inputs 
Our results show that the connections of firms with the international market 
influence their productivity level. The effect of tariffs and import penetration rates on 
productivity is often linked to the idea that competition accounts for the main source of 
trade liberalisation gains. However, the decrease of tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
generates a reduction of the price of imported inputs as well. It also increases the 
amount of bought inputs as well as their diversity. Domestic firms have access to a 
wider range of qualities for their intermediate goods at lower prices and/or to unknown 
technologies. This technology transfer may improve their productivity as well. We 
study this issue by taking into account the firms’ import shares. This variable has a 
positive and significant impact on TFP, and the other coefficient estimates (in particular 
IPR and Tariff) are not affected by this new variable. Based on this evidence, it is 
obvious that Spanish manufacturing firms benefited from an additional positive effect of 
openness via imports. This “technological effect” is complementary to the previous two 
effects of protection and foreign competition analysed.  
3.3.  Asymmetries in the sensitivity to protection and competition 
It is especially interesting to study whether the effect of trade variables on firm 
level productivity is conditioned by the firms’ characteristics. Our previous results 
describe accurately the firms’ average behaviour, but data at the firm level allow for a 
deeper analysis of heterogeneity of firms. In particular, size, origin of capital, export 
and import status may not explain directly their TFP level, but could explain the fact 
that they react differently to the same changes in trade indicators. In turn, this variety of 
reactions will translate in different productivity levels. Obviously, there are some 
correlations between these characteristics as shown in the summary statistics (Table 1 in 
appendix 1). In particular, large firms have, on average, larger export intensities, import 
intensities and share of foreign capital than small firms. Thus, the share of small firms 
that export or import is rather low compared to the one of large firms.   
In this section, we propose further estimations to investigate this issue. To this 
aim, we interact trade openness indicators with dummies that distinguish among these 
types of firms. The dummies we consider are: LARGE, firms with more than 50 
employees in its first year in the sample; HIGH FDI, takes the value 1 for firms with 
more than 10% of the capital coming from abroad at least one year in the sample and 0 
otherwise; EXPORTER takes the value 1 for firms that export more than 10% of their 
production at least one year in the sample and 0 otherwise; IMPORTER takes the value 
1 for, firms that imported at least one year over the period and 0 otherwise. SMALL  is   17
the counterpart of LARGE and LOW FDI, NO EXPORTER and NO IMPORTER are 
respectively the counterparts of HIGH FDI, EXPORTER and IMPORTER. They take 
the value 1 when their counterpart takes the value 0 and the value 0, otherwise. Results 
are displayed in Table 6 in appendix 1.  
Concerning size, our results show that the presence of foreign products has a 
similar impact on the productivity of large and small firms. Larger firms seem to react 
in a similar way as small firms to the increase of imports. In contrast, the size of firms 
matters, concerning their reactions to tariff cuts. Small firms are largely sensitive to 
tariffs while the coefficient estimate is not significant for large firms. IPR not only 
reflects the presence of non-EU products, but also of EU products in the Spanish 
market, while tariffs only affect non-EU products. The insensitivity of large firms to 
tariffs may reflect the fact that large firms are more sensitive to the competition at the 
EU level, while small firms are sensitive to any kind of competition. This result may 
also reflect the fact that EU products represent the main part of Spanish imports. 
Nevertheless, small firms are also sensitive to tariffs on third country products while 
large firms are not. When we take into account import status (column 2), the 
technological effect appears clearer than in previous estimations. While non-importing 
firms raise their productivity 1.2 % if IPR increases 10 %, the importers’ productivity 
increases 2,4% in the same while. Without more qualitative information about imported 
capital and intermediate goods and the share of each one of the two categories, it is 
difficult to test if the firms’ imports translate into better technology, better quality or 
better prices. Indeed, our results show that importing firms benefit from an additional 
positive effect when foreign competition increases. Firms that do not import are 2 times 
more sensitive to tariffs than importers. Non-importers are more affected by tariff cuts, 
which is consistent with the fact that non-importers are mostly small firms that are also 
more sensitive to third countries prices. We find some similar asymmetries among 
exporters and non-exporters and among firms with low or important foreign 
participation. Exporters take more advantage of foreign competition than non-exporters 
and are less sensible to tariffs. The same result holds for small firms and firms with 
lower foreign participation whose TFP is more sensitive to tariffs than large and foreign 
firms (non-significant). More surprisingly, firms with foreign ownership benefit less 
from foreign competition than others.  
In sum, small firms and those that do not import or export or, firms with mainly 
domestic ownership react more positively to tariff cuts. Tariff rates are a direct 
component of foreign products prices and the weakest firms (small firms, non-
exporting, non-importing or fully domestic owned firms) react stronger to prices than 
the others. In fact, the robust firms (big firms, exporting and importing firms, partially   18
or fully owned by foreigners) are more willing to produce under increasing returns. 
They face costs of production lower enough to decrease their prices via a reduction of 
their margin. On the opposite, the import penetration rate takes into account the 
reduction of non-tariff barriers of trade and the intensification of trade inside the EU. A 
higher level of this variable represents more foreign products on the domestic market. 
When the number of foreign products increases, the range of varieties available in the 
market raises. This process improves the quality of products and can also reduce the 
quantity sold by domestic firms. At this moment, even the most competitive firms have 
to react to the intensification of competition. In other words, when an increase of trade 
influences foreign prices, it does not influence the productivity of the most competitive 
firms but on the opposite, when there is a strong additional increase in the imported 
quantity and a quality improvement then, all the firms react strongly. In the period 
under study, Spanish tariffs for EU products were already set to zero, but the presence 
of European products in the Spanish market increases all over the period. It is then 
logical to find that all firms may have been affected by this phenomenon. During this 
post-liberalisation process, the variety of products have increased and in particular the 
availability of capital and intermediate goods. Importers have been able to match with 
their needs or to find inputs with better quality or with technologies still unknown. 
Therefore, importers benefit from the additional positive effects on their productivity 
level.  
4.  Conclusions 
During the last decade, Spain has experienced a rapid growth of external trade 
without facing big trade imbalances. Considering the huge increase of Spanish internal 
demand from the early nineties, the question of how to increase domestic production, 
competitiveness and productivity has been a key issue for Spain. This country is often 
viewed as a successful case for new EU members that worry about large trade 
imbalances since Spain seems to have managed this transition process quite well over 
the nineties. Though, the competitiveness of the Spanish economy started to decrease 
especially after the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the trade deficit has increased 
sharply in last years. According to Chóren et al. (2004), the inflation has been very 
harmful for the competitiveness of the Spanish economy in last years but this is mainly 
explained by the increase of prices in the non trading sectors. In the trading sectors 
(manufactures), productivity of labour has increased slowly, laboral and financial costs 
has been maintained but margins are diminished because of the increase of others costs.    19
We also find that TFP of manufacturing industries has increased slowly all over 
the period which is not a very bad performance since employment in the manufacturing 
sectors has increased at the same time. This growth of TFP is explained by a 
combination of the increase of intrafirm productivity that is, an amelioration of the 
technologies used, and the entry of more productive firms in most sectors, which could 
be partly explained by the opportunities that offered the openness process. Despite this 
moderate growth of TFP, we show that the decline of European tariffs on third 
countries’ products and the increase of the presence of foreign products contributed 
positively to this process. Moreover, these two effects are complementary. Another 
important finding is that importing foreign products has an additional positive impact on 
TFP, and can be seen as a proof for a technological effect that allows for additional 
productivity improvements.  
We confirm however theoretical predictions of the importance of heterogeneity 
of firms. Each type of firm does not react in the same way since some firms are more 
sensitive than others to tariffs and competition. In particular, small firms and firms that 
do not participate in foreign markets via exports, imports or ownership can be 
considered as more “sensitive” than others to tariff reductions. The effect of competitive 
pressure on TFP is similar for firms with different sizes. In contrast, importers and 
exporters react more positively to foreign competition in terms of TFP gains than other 
firms. 
Our paper concludes that, even in a European country with relatively low levels 
of protection such as Spain, there are additional gains to expect from the trade 
liberalisation process. However, a large part of the positive effect comes from the 
presence of foreign products and the more indirect effects of openness rather than from 
a tariff reduction.    20
Appendix 1 
TABLE 1.  Summary statistics 
 
Exporter* versus Non-exporter 
All  Small firms  Large firms 
Variables  Export. Non  Exp.  Export. Non  Exp.  Export. Non  Exp. 
Production  9 316 340  508 732  404 155  181 479  15 300 000  3 059 179 
Number of employees  327  38 27 20 526  174
Intermediate consumption  5 431 087  245 136  226 445  96 640  8 897 566  1 402 444 
Capital  4 166 867  255 124  120 067  60 243  6 862 182  1 773 935 
Export  Share  22.5 13.5 28.6 
Import  Share  11.3 1.9 5.8 1.6  15.1 3.8 
Foreign Capital Share  24.6 1.3 4.4 0.4  38.0 8.3 
 
Importer* versus Non-importer 
All  Small firms  Large firms 
Variables  Import. Non  Imp.  Import. Non Imp.  Import.  Non Imp. 
Production  9 222 062  257 821  430 983  147 004  14 900 000  1 730 882 
Number of employees  324 28 28 19 517  139
Intermediate consumption  5 366 680  122 751  245 867  71 969  8 702 912  797 783 
Capital  4 134 707  116 008  128 204  49 857  6 744 961  995 333 
Export Share  21.2 2.4  11.8 2.0  27.4 8.9 
Import Share  11.8 7.1  14.9 




Source: ESEE. Production, intermediate consumption and capital in 1.000 PTAS. Small firms are those that enter the database with less than 
50 employees. 
* Exporter: Firms that export at least one year during the period under study. 
Source: ESEE. Production, intermediate consumption and capital in 1.000 PTAS. Small firms are those that enter the database with less than 
50 employees. 
* Importer: Firms that export at least one year during the period under study.   21
TABLE 2.  Production estimates with Olley and Pakes (1996) method 
Industry l  k  m  N 
1 Food and tobacco  0.280*** 0.163*** 0.505***  2890 
 (0.011) (0.019)  (0.006)   
2 Textiles and textile products 0.401*** 0.043** 0.433***  2232 
 (0.012) (0.018)  (0.006)   
3 Leather and leather products 0.273*** 0.136*** 0.488***  652 
 (0.023) (0.011)  (0.012)   
4 Wood  0.389*** 0.278*** 0.360***  526 
 (0.029) (0.022)  (0.017)   
5 Paper  0.292*** 0.092*** 0.577***  602 
 (0.020) (0.012)  (0.016)   
6 Printing products  0.472*** 0.105*** 0.500*** 1100 
 (0.020) (0.009)  (0.011)   
7 Chemical products  0.334*** 0.184*** 0.499*** 1198 
 (0.014) (0.010)  (0.009)   
8 Rubber and plastic products 0.394*** 0.115*** 0.469***  1155 
 (0.014) (0.011)  (0.009)   
9 Other non-metallic mineral product 0.415*** 0.199*** 0.449***  1421 
 (0.014) (0.007)  (0.010)   
10 Basic metals  0.224*** 0.092*** 0.626***  688 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.009)   
11 Fabricated metal products 0.329*** 0.096*** 0.523***  1900 
 (0.013) (0.018)  (0.007)   
12 Machinery and equipment  0.416*** 0.037*** 0.513***  1527 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.008)   
13 Office equipment and precision 0.416*** 0.079*** 0.523***  352 
 (0.036) (0.017)  (0.016)   
14 Electrical and optical equipment 0.383*** 0.103* 0.565***  1506 
 (0.014) (0.009)  (0.008)   
15 Vehicles motor  0.365*** 0.100*** 0.532*** 957 
 (0.017) (0.004)  (0.009)   
16 Other transport equipment  0.300*** 0.119*** 0.559***  358 
 (0.032) (0.011)  (0.016)   
17 Other manufactured products 0.393*** 0.068*** 0.517***  1478 
   (0.015) (0.024)  (0.009)   
Source: Authors calculation. Standards errors are in parenthesis * significant at 10%, **at 5%; ***at 1%.   22
TABLE 3.  MFN tariffs, EU 
 1991 1996  2002
1  Food and tobacco 
2  Textiles and textile products 
3  Leather and leather products 
4 Wood 
5 Paper 
6 Printing  products 
7 Chemical  products 
8  Rubber and plastic products 
9  Other non-metallic mineral product 
10 Basic  metals 
11  Fabricated metal products 
12  Machinery and equipment n.e.c 
13  Office equipment and precision 
14  Electrical and optical equipment 
15 Vehicles  motor 
16  Other transport equipment 
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TABLE 4.  Decomposition of productivity growth (1991-2002), Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) 
  Industry  Within effect  Between effect  Covariance effect  Entry effect  Exit effect  Total 
1  Food and tobacco  0.024  -0.081 0.067  -0.021  0.049  -0.059 
2  Textiles and textile products 0.091  0.014  0.092  0.037  -0.009  0.242 
3  Leather and leather products -0.004  -0.031  0.047  0.173  0.027  0.157 
4 Wood  0.242  0.022  -0.054  0.122  0.024 0.308 
5 Paper  0.133  -0.001  -0.032  0.192  0.005 0.288 
6 Printing  products  0.126  -0.001 -0.046  0.095  0.008  0.166 
7 Chemical  products  0.077 0.044  0.102  0.072  0.019  0.276 
8  Rubber and plastic products 0.084  0.004  0.079  0.173  0.005  0.334 
9  Other non-metallic mineral product 0.104  0.012  0.085 0.058  0.016  0.243 
10 Basic  metals  0.093  -0.007  0.017  0.084  0.017  0.171 
11  Fabricated metal products 0.029  -0.003  0.019  0.018  0.040  0.023 
12  Machinery and equipment n.e.c 0.098  -0.020 0.101  0.037  -0.007  0.223 
13  Office equipment and precision 0.016  -0.002 0.020  0.060  0.011  0.083 
14  Electrical and optical equipment 0.052  -0.007  0.086  0.209  0.011  0.329 
15 Vehicles  motor  0.027  -0.036 0.110  0.099  0.006  0.195 
16  Other transport equipment  0.020  -0.014  0.107  0.002  -0.031  0.147 
17  Other manufactured products  0.160 -0.023  -0.088  -0.014  -0.016  0.051 
Source: Authors calculation. 
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Dependent variable: ln(TFPit) 
Model :  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IPR 0.265***  0.250***  0.240*** 0.241*** 0.222*** 0.217***
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Tarift-1     -0.230*** -0.227*** -0.218*** -0.138*** -0.143*** -0.135***
      (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Foreign 0.069*  0.079**  0.062* 0.072* 0.083** 0.068* 0.069* 0.076**  0.062*
Capital ratio  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.035) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Mratiot-1   0.160***  0.139*** 0.147*** 0.135***  0.156*** 0.139***
   (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)  (0.050) (0.049)
Xratiot-1 0.087**   0.065* 0.067* 0.045 0.072**   0.050
  (0.034)   (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)   (0.034)
Herfindahl -0.141***  -0.134***  -0.147*** -0.050 -0.053 -0.065 -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.123***
 (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Market Share  0.120**  0.112*  0.117** 0.149** 0.154** 0.154** 0.132** 0.124** 0.128**
 (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.056) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056)
TFPt-1 0.333***  0.334***  0.336*** 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.339*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.334***
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant -0.066***  -0.066*** -0.067*** 0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.048***
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Year  dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations  15772 15772 15772 15772 15772 15772 15772 15772 15772
        
For all the tests the p-value  are  reported:        
m1. 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.128  0.298  0.299 0.324 0.314 0.308 0.323 0.312 0.308
Sargan 0.311  0.330  0.683 0.130 0.304 0.706 0.159 0.403 0.728
Source : Authors’ calculation. Standards errors are in parenthesis * significant at 10%, **at 5%; ***at 1%.  
 




Dependent variable: ln(TFPit) 
Model :  (1) (2) (3) (4)
IPR*LARGE   0.238***   
   (0.045)   
IPR*SMALL   0.206***   
   (0.042)   
Tarift-1*LARGE   -0.017   
   (0.031)   
Tarift-1*SMALL   -0.237***   
   (0.029)   
IPR*IMPORTER   0.243***   
   (0.040)   
IPR*NO IMPORTER    0.117**   
   (0.047)   
Tarift-1*IMPORTER   -0.072**   
   (0.031)   
Tarift-1* NO IMPORTER    -0.205***   
   (0.037)   
IPR*EXPORTER   0.231***  
   (0.043)  
IPR*NO EXPORTER    0.180***  
   (0.042)  
Tarift-1*EXPORTER   -0.088***  
   (0.033)  
Tarift-1* NO EXPORTER    -0.145***  
   (0.027)  
IPR*HIGH FDI       0.168***
      (0.060)
IPR*LOW FDI       0.235***
      (0.041)
Tarift-1* HIGH FDI       0.057
      (0.051)
Tarift-1* LOW FDI        -0.185***
      (0.025)
Foreign   0.047 0.050 0.037   0.082**
Capital ratio    (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)   (0.037)
Mratiot-1   0.131*** 0.137*** 0.141***   0.132***
   (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)   (0.048)
Xratio t-1   0.047 0.044 0.059   0.052
   (0.034) (0.034) (0.037)   (0.033)
Herfindahl   -0.144*** -0.136*** -0.134***   -0.126***
   (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)   (0.040)
Market Share    0.144*** 0.136** 0.127**   0.129**
   (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)   (0.054)
TFPt-1   0.341*** 0.337*** 0.342***   0.340***
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)   (0.016)
Constant   -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.045***   -0.051***
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.012)
Year dummies    yes yes yes   yes
Observations   15772 15772 15772   15772
     
For all the tests the p-value are reported:             
m1   0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000
m2   0.287 0.298 0.280   0.285
Sargan   0.697 0.711 0.604   0.924
Source : Authors’ calculation. Standards errors are in parenthesis * significant at 10%, **at 5%; ***at 1%.  
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  Appendix 2. Data 
For the cleaning process, we choose to use interpolation to fill the gaps for a 
particular variable if a firm reported no value in a given year, while values were 
reported in the year prior and the year after the missing one. In particular, we did so, for 
all the components of the value added, labour and investment, in order to obtain better 
estimates for the TFP. This only applies for 114 observations of 24241. We dropped 
from the sample all the observations corresponding to firms that did not answered this 
year except if data were interpolated using the criterion explained above. The capital 
stock is measured using the inventory perpetual method with a depreciation rate of 9% 
base on the average depreciation rate as used in FBBA (2005). After eliminating the 
firm for which we do not have fixed asset in any year we have 3167 observations per 
year. We finally dropped observations with unrealistic large spikes in the data (e.g. 
value-added negative, growth in value added of more than 300% with a reduction of 
employment).  
We use production price index at 3-digit industry level to express in constant 
terms the production and the intermediary consumption. To deflate the capital, we 
deflate the investment by the investment price index at 3-digit level. The other variables 
do not need to be deflated because they are expressed in numbers or in ratios. Deflators 
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